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In this paper I examine the conception of evil and the prescriptions for its mitigation that 
Michel Serres has articulated in his most recent works. My explication of Serres’s 
argument centers on the claim, advanced in many different texts, that practices of 
exclusion, motivated by what he calls “the terrifying concupiscence of belonging,” are 
the primary sources of evil in the world. After explicating Serres’s argument, I examine 
three important objections, concluding that Serres overestimates somewhat the role of 




 The question of evil has been among the most persistent themes in the work of 
Michel Serres. Although he has examined evil from different points of view in his 
various texts, Serres has been consistent in emphasizing its intimate connection with 
identity. More specifically, he has argued that the origin of evil lies in our tendency to 
consolidate our identities through practices of exclusion. In what follows, I will begin by 
arguing that Serres’s account of this tendency is best understood with reference to the 
concept of noise, which he borrows from information theory. I will then examine in detail 
the proposals that Serres has advanced in works published over approximately the last 
fifteen years for addressing the problem of evil. Finally, I will offer a critical evaluation 
of these proposals, arguing that Serres considerably overstates the importance of identity 
and the exclusion of noise in perpetuating evil, and consequently that he overestimates 
the degree to which renouncing the struggle against the noise can contribute to 
eliminating it. Nonetheless, I argue that with certain modifications, Serres’s account can 
provide important tools both for understanding and for mitigating evil. 
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I. Noise and the Formation of Identity 
 In some of his most important early works, Serres gives an account of the 
formation and consolidation of identity, both collective and individual, in terms of the 
basic concepts of information theory. Broadly speaking, information theory is concerned 
with understanding the process by which messages, which are encoded by their senders 
and transmitted across channels of communication, are received and decoded at their 
points of destination. The insight from information theory that is most important for 
Serres’s project is that in any act of communication, the message that the sender intends 
to convey will be distorted to at least some degree by the properties of the channel of 
communication across which it is sent. A message that is broadcast by radio, for example, 
might be distorted by static to such an extent that the receiver misunderstands it, or even 
fails to receive it at all. The message conveyed by a handwritten note might be distorted 
by the sender’s misspellings or by her bad handwriting. Even in face-to-face verbal 
communication, the sender’s message might be distorted by her mispronunciations or by 
a regional dialect to which the receiver is unaccustomed.1 In the language of information 
theory, these phenomena that manifest themselves as interfering with the reception of a 
message—static, non-standard pronunciations, dialects, stuttering, misspelling, etc.—are 
called noise. It is Serres’s thesis that we become who we are, that we consolidate our 
identities, by excluding this noise. 
 In the essay “Platonic Dialogue,” Serres presents the interlocutors in Plato’s 
dialogues as examples of this phenomenon. A common interpretation of these dialogues 
holds that the relation between the interlocutors is best understood as one of opposition. 
But according to Serres, the interlocutors are more basically on the same side, struggling 
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together to hold at bay the noise that threatens ceaselessly to disrupt their search for truth. 
For Serres, “to hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and to seek to exclude him; a 
successful communication is the exclusion of the third man…. We might call this third 
man the demon, the prosopopeia of noise.”2  In Book X of The Republic for example, 
Socrates and Glaucon struggle together against the noise that interferes with the 
intellection of the forms. In order to help Glaucon to conceive the form of a bed, Socrates 
emphasizes its difference from beds in appearance, i.e., from particular beds with their 
particular colors, sizes, and shapes, seen from particular points of view.3  Particular beds 
function as the media or channels through which the idea of the bed is made manifest. 
But like bad handwriting or radio static, they inevitably interfere with the clear, 
undistorted conception of the idea. One becomes a philosopher, then, by learning how to 
perceive the ideal through the noise of the sensuously given particulars that typically 
conceal it. In a similar way, one becomes an English speaker by learning to exclude the 
almost limitless variety of sounds that the human voice can make but that do not function 
as carriers of signification within the language. And one develops a consistent moral 
point of view by learning to exclude certain dimensions of practical experience as noise. 
One becomes a Kantian, for example, by learning to experience the inclinations as a kind 
of moral noise, interfering with the reception of the pure moral law.   
 Importantly, what counts as the message and what counts as noise depends on 
one’s point of view. To exemplify this idea, Serres asks the reader to imagine herself 
engaged in conversation at a party that she is hosting. At some point the conversation is 
interrupted by the ringing of the telephone. From the point of view of the host who is 
engaged in conversation, the ringing telephone is noise: it interrupts the ongoing 
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exchange of messages. But as soon as the host answers the telephone, that same 
conversation becomes noise: it interrupts the exchange of messages between her and the 
caller. This new conversation, brought into existence by the noise of the ringing 
telephone, creates a new we, a new community whose continued existence depends on 
excluding the noise of the party. From the point of view of the guests, who are excluded 
from the we that consists of the host and the caller, it is the telephone conversation that 
counts as noise. The guests now constitute a separate we, whose continued existence 
depends on excluding the noise of the telephone conversation.4 What counts as message 
and what counts as noise, then, depends on one’s relation to various we’s or communities 
of meaning. From within the community of those whose consistent moral perspective is 
broadly Kantian, the pure moral law counts as the message and the inclinations count as 
the noise. But for those outside that community, the pure moral law counts as noise: they 
will likely experience it as a distorted version of something else, such as self-love or 
utility. Likewise, for those within the community of people who appreciate the works of 
John Cage, what normally counts as background noise—the sounds of pages of music 
being turned, of listeners shifting in their seats, of air conditioning systems, etc.—is itself 
experienced as the message. For those outside this community, the background noise is 
just noise. 
 This perspective-dependence of noise and message contributes to the 
rigidification of group identities and to the establishment of oppositional relations with 
others. A community reinforces both its own identity and its difference from other 
communities by producing what the latter perceive as noise. On the one hand, this 
production of noise constitutes an unambiguous gesture of exclusion. In-jokes, “talking 
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shop,” and abbreviated references to a shared history are common examples: the outsider 
experiences these as noise and thus as obstacles to his participation in the group. On the 
other hand, this production of noise strengthens the bonds of recognition that hold the 
community together: we are the ones who can understand this noise. In his recent book, 
Le Mal propre: Polluer pour s’approprier?, Serres describes this behavior as a kind of 
territory marking, not unlike the tiger’s marking the limits of his territory with urine.  
Referring to the Gascon dialect of French that he speaks, Serres observes that “when the 
French hear me speak, they know immediately that I was not born in Dunkirk, or in 
Landivisiau, or in Niedermorschwihr. Trace of alterity within belonging, noise or waste 
within language, my accent projects my own place within the common place. I hold on to 
my place of birth by means of the noise that my language makes.”5 
 To affirm one’s identity in this way is necessarily to close oneself off, at least to 
some extent, from those who do not share that identity. For if the noise that consolidates 
my identity as belonging to a particular community of meaning ceases to be experienced 
by the other as noise, then I become much less secure in that identity, perhaps even losing 
it entirely. The same thing happens if the noise that consolidates other groups’ identities 
ceases to be experienced by me as noise. To the extent, for example, that I come to 
understand the grievances of the Palestinian people, articulated in terms of a history and a 
religion that I do not share, as something other than noise, I put in question my identity as 
a staunch defender of Israel’s cause. And for reasons that can be described once again in 
terms of information theory, that is precisely what I am unlikely to want to do. Noise 
manifests itself as a force of disruption or, at worst, of destruction, and thus as something 
that must be held at bay or eliminated entirely. From the perspective of a community of 
 6 
meaning, the noise is an evil that must be repressed.  In carrying out this repression, the 
group positions itself as “the good, the just, the true, the natural, the normal.”6 The 
community, consolidated by these processes of exclusion, is good. The noise is evil. 
II. Renouncing the Struggle against the Noise 
 It would not be an exaggeration to state that the whole of Serres’s ethical 
philosophy is grounded in his insistence that this equation of noise and evil is profoundly 
mistaken. According to Serres, it is the struggle against the noise, along with the “passion 
for belonging” with which it is inextricably linked, that is the source of “all the evil in the 
world.”7 There are, of course, manifestations of the passion for belonging that are more 
or less benign, such as cheering for one’s favorite sports teams.8 But many of its 
manifestations, including racism, sexism, and homophobia, constitute serious social evils. 
For the sexist man, a woman’s articulation of her own experience is mere noise: 
“everybody” knows that women are impossible to understand. To make the effort no 
longer to hear women’s articulations of their experience as noise would be to put in 
question the man’s identity; his unwillingness to do so contributes to the perpetuation of 
very real harms and injustices against women. The passion for belonging also manifests 
itself as nationalism and war: we, the good, must protect ourselves from the others who 
cannot be reasoned with and who, as is often said, can only understand the language of 
force. For Serres, then, the solution to the problem of evil consists in our renouncing the 
struggle against the noise, and along with it the “terrifying concupiscence of belonging.”9 
 Serres develops this idea in The Parasite through a close reading of Jean de La 
Fontaine’s fable “The Gardener and his Lord.” The gardener of the story has enclosed his 
garden with a hedge, thereby demarcating a space that was to be wholly his own. Within 
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this space, the gardener maintained a kind of closed economy: the vegetables that he 
grew were consumed within the household and the flowers were used to make bouquets 
for his daughter. One day, however, the gardener discovered that the closed system had 
been breached by a hare, which he found nibbling on his vegetables. From the 
perspective of the gardener’s closed system, the hare is evil; it is a noise that disrupts 
what is proper, inserting itself between the gardener’s labor and his consumption of its 
products. Eager to chase the hare from the enclosed garden, but unable to do so himself, 
the gardener called to his aid the local lord. But in attempting to chase the hare from the 
garden, the lord’s horses trampled on the vegetables and tore a hole in the hedge far 
wider than the one through which the hare had originally entered. The lord and his retinue 
ended up doing “more damage in an hour than all the hares of the province would have 
done in a hundred years.”10 The struggle against the noise, in other words, produces far 
more evil than the noise itself. Clearly it would have been better for the gardener to learn 
to live with the noise. Indeed, Serres believes, there is no alternative; there is no such 
thing as an inside—proper, pure, and good—that would be wholly closed off from the 
noise outside. “There is always a hare in the garden. There always was a hare….”11 
Tolerance, according to Serres, begins with this insight, “and maybe morality as well.”12 
 In the works that he has published within approximately the last fifteen years, 
Serres has expressed optimism about our capacity to learn to live with the hare in the 
garden. This optimism is based in part on the new experience of space that is made 
possible by the increased interconnectivity that accompanies the processes of 
globalization.  Serres provides an intuitively compelling example of this new conception 
of space in Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time:  
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If you take a handkerchief and spread it out in order to iron it, you can see in it 
certain fixed distances and proximities. If you sketch a circle in one area, you 
can mark out nearby points and measure far-off distances. Then take the same 
handkerchief and crumple it, by putting it in your pocket. Two distant points 
suddenly are close, even superimposed. If, further, you tear it in certain places, 
two points that were close can become very distant.13 
In this new, topological conception of space, the rigid distinction between inside and 
outside, between what is proper and what is not, breaks down. With the advent of the 
mobile telephone, for example, the positions in space that are occupied by my 
interlocutor and me become less and less important. Although we may occupy distant 
positions on the ironed and flattened-out handkerchief, the mobile telephone helps to 
render us virtually neighbors.14 Likewise, the Internet allows me to access Le Monde (and 
hence, le monde) as easily as I can access my hometown newspaper. On the flattened-out 
handkerchief, I am separated from France by a great distance. Nonetheless, I do not 
experience events in France—the recent debates concerning national identity and the role 
of religious expression in public life, for example—as mere noise. Indeed these events 
interest me and shape my consciousness of the world to a far greater extent than most 
events that take place in my own hometown.   
 Serres expresses this point in a compelling way in Atlas when he insists that “we 
are not beings-there [des êtres là].”15 The idea of being-there does articulate something 
important about the lives of non-human animals, which cannot survive outside the places 
to which they have adapted. The arctic hare, for example, with its thick coat of white fur 
and its strong claws for digging into the tightly packed snow, is in an important sense its 
there. As a description of human life, however, being-there is both false and morally 
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problematic. It is false because in the topological space described above, the notion of 
place, of a fixed “there,” loses much of its sense. And it is morally problematic because it 
reinforces the processes of exclusion and the passion for belonging that Serres believes 
are the sources of evil. One of the most important pieces of information we typically want 
to know about the people we meet is where they are from. This concern presupposes a 
kind of identification between “le où et le vous,” the “where” and the “you,” which Serres 
finds “strange, tragic, oppressive, and worn out. Cause of violence and of war.”16 With 
the decreasing importance of place that is made possible by global interconnectedness, 
however, we can begin to think of ourselves less as être-là and more as être-n’importe-
où, as being-anywhere. 
 Serres’s confidence in our ability to renounce the passion for belonging is also 
based on a new experience of time, made possible by recent discoveries that allow us to 
determine with a high degree of precision the age of the universe and of everything in 
it.17 Serres develops this point by means of a humorous anecdote: 
When last December I asked the attendant in the skeleton room of a museum 
of natural history the age of a giant saurian, he responded: 
--One-hundred twenty million years, eleven months. 
--How can you calculate such a precise date? I asked. 
--Easily, he said: the museum hired me in the middle of last winter. At that 
time the pedestal read “one-hundred twenty million.” Count it up, it comes out 
just right.18 
Of course we cannot calculate the age of the giant saurian as precisely as that, and so it 
might strike us as funny that the attendant would even consider the eleven months that 
had elapsed since he had been hired. But, Serres argues, in our everyday, common-sense 
conception of time, we commit an error even more ridiculous than the museum 
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attendant’s. As individuals we tend to regard as “our own” only the time that has passed 
since our births. In fact, however, each of us is irreducibly multitemporal: in our bodies 
are gathered together times of vastly different scales. Our brains, for example, contain 
parts that date from hundreds of millions of years ago along with parts that are as new as 
the genus Homo. The structure of DNA is more than three billion years old, while the 
hydrogen and carbon atoms of which we are composed are as old as the universe.19 
Likewise, we tend to identify with “our” cultural traditions, languages, and religious 
practices, ignoring our common cultural inheritance, which dates back to the moment that 
Lucy began walking upright, and which includes the cave paintings at Lascaux, the 
invention of agriculture during the Neolithic Age, and the invention of writing.20 
Advances in our understanding of genetics and of anthropogenesis have brought to our 
attention the connections between our own history—the history of the United States or of 
the West, for example—with that of the Fuegians, the Australian Aborigines, and indeed 
the whole of humanity.21 Thus, to identify “our” time as the time since our births or as the 
time of our own culture is, to mix Serres’s metaphors, to plant a hedge around the eleven 
months and to exclude the one-hundred twenty million years. Nonetheless, our increasing 
knowledge of human interconnectedness across time helps us to recognize this mistake 
and, if Serres’s optimism is justified, contributes to the possibility of a more universal, 
less exclusive we.  
III. The Pluripotent Subject 
 Of course this increased interconnectedness across space and time is a double-
edged sword.  New and wider connections certainly help us to renounce our impassioned 
identifications with particular states, cultures, languages, religions, etc. But in renouncing 
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these identifications we also run the risk of forming new communities that are even more 
rigidly exclusive. If connection between people is to be something more than an 
abstraction, then commonalities between them must be established. Serres offers as an 
example of this point the merchants of fourteenth-century Venice, who established 
profitable relations of commerce with the rest of the Mediterranean world. The new 
connections that these merchants formed were fraught with risk: speaking different 
languages, buyers and sellers might miscommunicate; buyers and sellers might disagree 
about the correct weights or sizes of the merchandise; or buyers might try to pay in 
impure coins. Disagreements such as these could prove very costly to the merchants. The 
solution to this problem was to normalize weights and measures, to come to an agreement 
on the value of different currencies, and to agree on a lingua franca.22 Those who agreed 
to these terms of cooperation benefitted, while those who did not agree were excluded.  
Critics have presented the contemporary phenomenon of globalization as a magnification 
of these kinds of standardizing practices and of their attendant evils. Some, for example, 
understand globalization as the creation of a homogeneous, primarily American, world 
culture that excludes or at least devalues local traditions. Others emphasize the economic 
standardization imposed by such global institutions as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund: in order to benefit from these global institutions, many 
underdeveloped states must agree to conditionalities that reflect the so-called Washington 
Consensus, which imposes a standard program of privatization, lower tax rates, and trade 
liberalization, and which does not take into account different states’ histories, traditions, 
or the particular needs of their populations. In sum, these critics suggest that increased 
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interconnectedness does not weaken, but rather stabilizes and strengthens, the relations of 
exclusion that give rise to evil. 
 But the very possibility of such dissolutions and reformulations of identity 
presupposes a dimension of openness within us that exceeds and thus calls into question 
our existing identities. No matter how strongly I might identify myself with a particular 
group—Americans, philosophers, English speakers, wristwatch collectors, etc.—it is 
never strictly correct to say that I am an American, an English speaker, etc.23 Rather, 
what is more me than any of these identifications is the dimension of openness and 
possibility that makes them possible in the first place. This dimension becomes especially 
salient whenever we leave behind our previous identities and take up new ones. For 
example, as I begin to learn to speak German, I still experience myself very much as an 
English speaker: I pronounce German words and construct German sentences just as an 
English speaker would. When I read a sentence correctly, I do so by translating each 
word into English. But if I persist in doing that, I will never be a German speaker. In 
order to effect the transition from monolingual English speaker to speaker of both 
English and German, I must stop orienting myself exclusively with reference to my 
native language. I must commit to reading, hearing, and speaking the German language 
on its own terms, even though that is precisely what I do not know how to do. Once I 
make that leap, I find myself disoriented, open to possibilities of sense that I experience 
as vaguely present, but that I cannot yet render determinate. I pick out some of the 
individual words, but for the most part I hear them as all run together. Or perhaps I pick 
out most of the words, but can’t quite make sense of how they are ordered. If things go 
well, though, I will eventually catch on to the sense of German and I will forget this 
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experience of disorientation. At that point I will be a German speaker. Nonetheless, this 
middle position, open and saturated with possibility, is the condition of possibility for any 
kind of change in identity. If I am anything at all, then I am most fundamentally that open 
possibility.24 The more exposure I have, willingly or not, to unfamiliar cultures, 
languages, religions, etc., the more salient that dimension of possibility becomes. 
 Serres compares our condition in this regard to that of a stem cell.25 The most 
important thing about a stem cell is that it is pluripotent: it is not yet any particular kind 
of cell (a skin cell, blood cell, nerve cell, etc.), but it has the capacity to develop into 
almost any kind. We human beings are similarly pluripotent: we have the capacity to 
adapt to any culture, to speak any language, and to appreciate any kind of artistic 
expression. Our constant and relatively successful adaptation to so many cultural 
innovations in the contemporary world provides compelling evidence for this point. Our 
pluripotency, according to Serres, constitutes our true identity as human beings. To learn 
to identify ourselves first and foremost with this pluripotency, and no longer with the 
differentiated and opposed forms of life that it makes possible, would be to renounce the 
passion for belonging. This kind of identification is exemplified for Serres by Diogenes 
the Cynic. Asked where he came from, Diogenes declined to identify himself with 
reference to his native polis, insisting instead that he was kosmopolitēs, a citizen of the 
world.26 It is also exemplified for Serres by St. Paul.  Prior to his conversion, the Pharisee 
Saul had been “extremely zealous for the traditions of [his] fathers.”27 This zeal inspired 
him to participate actively in the persecution of the new Christian sect.28 After his 
conversion, though, Paul renounced the passion for belonging that had led to such evils: 
“There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor 
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female—for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.”29 Instead of identifying himself and 
others with reference to the groups to which they belonged, Paul came to emphasize the 
empty I which, like the stem cell, is nothing in particular and therefore potentially 
everything. The empty I is open: it is not identified by its relations of opposition with 
other I’s or with other kinds of I’s. It can be described, according to Serres, in the same 
way that Paul describes love: “It does not envy, it does not boast, it is not proud. It is not 
rude, it is not self-seeking, it is not easily angered, it keeps no record of wrongs.”30 The 
solution to the problem of evil consists in our learning to identify ourselves with this 
open, empty, and thus universal, I. 
IV. Critical Evaluation 
 I believe that Serres’s account of evil is a compelling one. Many of the world’s 
evils can certainly be traced back to the tendency of people to commit themselves too 
rigidly to their identities. And the language of information theory does, I think, provide a 
compelling way to understand that tendency. Nonetheless, there are some important 
objections that could be raised against both Serres’s account of evil and his proposal for 
its mitigation. The most obvious objection pertains to Serres’s claim, repeated in many 
different places, that the passion for belonging is the source of “all the evil in the world.” 
Surely this claim is too simplistic: there are many evils that we would understand very 
poorly if we attributed them solely to the passion for belonging.  Many cases of child 
neglect and family violence, for example, can certainly be attributed to alcoholism, drug 
addiction, or high levels of stress. And despite the numerous criticisms that have been 
raised against her thesis concerning the banality of evil, surely Hannah Arendt is correct 
to note that at least some of the world’s evils can be traced back to our failure to 
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understand or to reflect on what we are doing. There are other evils, I would submit, that 
are connected in an obvious way to the passion for belonging, but that owe their 
persistence at least in part to our not knowing how to effectively address them. Racism in 
the United States is an example of this: even if everyone in the United States were to 
renounce his or her passion for racial belonging, the pernicious effects of centuries of 
institutional racism would still persist. Reasonable people of good will would find it 
extraordinarily difficult, even in the most favorable circumstances, to achieve a 
consensus on the most just way to right past wrongs. The cases of sexism, long-standing 
ethnic and religious conflict, and international economic inequality are similar in this 
regard. In light of this set of fairly obvious objections, I think it would be most charitable 
to interpret Serres as advancing the more modest claim that many of the world’s evils 
have their source, at least in part, in the passion for belonging, and that the renunciation 
of that passion would contribute greatly to the mitigation of those evils. 
 Even in this more modest form, however, Serres’s position is open to at least three 
serious objections, which I will examine in turn. The first of these pertains to the question 
of power, which is largely absent in Serres’s work. Specifically, Serres’s prescriptions for 
mitigating evil seem to disregard entirely the role that the passion for belonging can play 
in struggles against injustice and oppression. In The Power of Identity, an important work 
on the role of identity in the highly interconnected world of globalization, the sociologist 
Manuel Castells describes what he calls resistance identities, which are “generated by 
those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of 
domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles 
different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society….”31 Castells’s 
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most powerful example of resistance identity is the Zapatistas, a group of insurgents 
based in the southernmost Mexican state of Chiapas. The Zapatistas are primarily 
indigenous peasants who view themselves as unjustly disempowered by the program of 
neoliberal economic modernization undertaken by the Mexican government, and who 
place themselves more broadly within a historical lineage of anti-colonial activism that 
dates back to 1492.32 Importantly, solidarity among the Zapatistas is not based on 
traditional ethnic identifications; indeed, the people who constitute the Zapatista 
movement have historically been divided, not united by their ethnic identities. Zapatista 
solidarity instead emphasizes what the various ethnic groups that compose it have in 
common, viz. an unjustly disadvantaged position in Mexican political and economic 
life.33 But the Zapatistas have also been unusually effective at making use of the 
technology of mass communication, including the Internet, to spread their message and to 
persuade people all over the world, most of whom do not experience the same kinds of 
oppression, to identify with their cause. If the Zapatistas and their international network 
of supporters are even moderately effective in their resistance to social and economic 
injustice, then it seems as if their renouncing the passion for belonging would contribute 
not to the mitigation of evil, but rather to its exacerbation. 
 I think it is certainly true that the passion for belonging can play, and indeed has 
played, an important role in combating genuine evils, and that an adequate account of the 
relation between evil and the passion for belonging would need to address the unequal 
relations of power that obtain between groups. But it is also important to recall that 
groups are almost always very bad judges in their own cases. In the narratives they tell 
about themselves, groups typically portray themselves as good and as opposed to other 
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groups, whom they see as evil. For example, in her classic history of the American West, 
The Legacy of Conquest, Patricia Nelson Limerick describes in detail the pervasive self-
understanding of white settlers as “injured innocents,” victims of injustices perpetrated 
against them by the natives whom they were often violently displacing.34 Another 
example is Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese religious cult that carried out a sarin gas attack 
on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Members of the cult viewed themselves as forces for 
good, working to “save Japan, and eventually the world, from the war of extermination 
that would inevitably result from the competing efforts by Japanese corporations and 
American imperialism to establish a new world order and a united world government.”35 
Those of us who are not pioneers in the nineteenth-century American West or members 
of Aum Shinrikyo almost certainly recognize that their self-understandings are false, or at 
least extremely partial and one-sided. But the fact that both of these groups were so 
thoroughly convinced of the righteousness of their causes should give us pause. While 
these examples do not demonstrate that the passion for belonging always contributes to 
evil, they do, I think, give us reason to treat claims that it contributes to good in particular 
cases with considerable skepticism. Perhaps, then, a reasonable revision of Serres’s 
position could be stated as follows: given that we are more likely to err on the side of 
overestimating the goodness of our own group and the evil of others, and given that we 
are likely to do greater evil in overestimating this way, we ought to accept the 
renunciation of the passion for belonging as a default position and accept its contribution 
to good in particular cases only after serious reflection. 
The second objection that I would like to consider represents a broadly 
communitarian point of view: one might argue that to renounce the struggle against the 
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noise and to identify, like Diogenes and St. Paul, with the empty, universal I is to 
undermine the very conditions that are necessary for the development and sustenance of 
moral experience. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, “it is an essential characteristic of 
the morality which each of us acquires that it is learned from, in and through the way of 
life of some particular community.”36 Our education as moral agents necessarily begins 
in our relationships with members of our own communities, whom we love and trust, and 
whose expectations and judgments we take seriously. It is within the context of these 
relationships that our action in the world comes to have a specifically moral orientation: 
we learn to recognize particular goods as worth pursuing and particular models of the 
well-lived life as intimately connected with those goods. These goods and ways of living 
are irreducibly community-specific. To become a good father, for example, one must 
look to the models of good fatherhood exemplified in one’s own community. Of course 
every community has some conception of what it is to be a good father, and to some 
extent the conceptions of different communities overlap. But there is no universal 
conception of good fatherhood that would be sufficiently thick to effectively orient the 
behavior of particular fathers in particular communities. One has a good reason to act in 
accordance with a particular model of fatherhood because particular sons and daughters, 
wives, grandparents, and fellow community members in general expect and depend on it. 
In order, then, to live the kind of life associated with being a good father, one must 
identify with one’s own community, whose conception of good fatherhood one 
understands clearly. The same is true, of course, for one who aspires to be a good 
colleague, a good citizen, and even a good human being. According to MacIntyre, it 
follows from this “that I find my justification for allegiance to these rules of morality in 
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my particular community; deprived of the life of that community, I would have no reason 
to be moral.”37  
 To translate this communitarian objection into the language of information theory, 
we might say that the cultivation and maintenance of genuine moral subjectivity 
presupposes the community conceived as a relatively noise-free system for the 
communication of moral information. According to MacIntyre, obeying “the rules of 
morality is characteristically and generally a hard task for human beings…. We are 
continually liable to be blinded by immediate desire, to be distracted from our 
responsibilities, [and] to lapse into backsliding.”38 In order to combat these problems, it is 
essential that the community furnish its members with clear, relatively undistorted moral 
information. Practical subjects must be able to discern straightforwardly the moral sense 
of typically recurring situations: they must have relatively clear conceptions of their 
obligations to different persons or institutions within the community and of the modes of 
life that are made possible by meeting those obligations. If, for example, the members of 
a community lack a clear conception of what it is to be a good colleague at work—if they 
do not know very precisely what they owe their co-workers, their superiors, and their 
institutions, and if they are therefore insensitive to the feeling of pride that typically 
accompanies the consciousness of being a valued colleague—then there is a high 
likelihood that they will succumb to the temptations of selfishness and laziness. It seems 
to follow from this kind of account that communities can secure the necessary conditions 
of moral life only by closing in on themselves, excluding moral noise to the greatest 
extent possible. 
 20 
 Critics of this position have pointed out that communities have never actually 
excluded noise to the extent that the communitarian account of moral development seems 
to require. From the beginning, communities have been affected, and even produced, by 
migrations and hybridizations. In his Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, 
Kwame Anthony Appiah describes his own childhood in Kumasi, Ghana where 
“Christians, Muslims, and the followers of traditional religions live side by side, 
accepting each other’s different ways without expressing much curiosity about them” and 
where one interacted regularly and as a matter of course with Indians, Syrians, Lebanese, 
Greeks, Hungarians, and various northern Europeans. 39 He explains that the textiles that 
are so closely associated with the cultures of West Africa were milled and sold by the 
Dutch.40 Even the bagpipes are believed to have come to Scotland from Egypt via the 
Roman infantry.41 Appiah concludes from this that “we do not need, have never needed, 
settled community, a homogeneous system of values…. Cultural purity is an 
oxymoron.”42  
 But even if we concede that actual communities are not, and perhaps never have 
been, quite as homogeneous and gemeinschaftlich as some have imagined them to be, 
there still remains something importantly right, both descriptively and normatively, in the 
communitarian objection. The communitarian is certainly correct to argue that the 
development and maintenance of moral subjectivity requires at minimum communities 
that are not so overrun with noise that they become unable to effectively communicate 
moral information to their members. But communities can and do achieve the requisite 
levels of noise reduction without having to be culturally pure or homogeneous. 
Communities may in fact be hybrids all the way down, but this does not by itself prevent 
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them from effectively communicating contentful, relatively thick normative expectations 
to their members. Contra an extreme (and perhaps straw-man) version of 
communitarianism, then, communities do not require for their survival an ongoing effort 
to exclude noise to the greatest extent possible. As Appiah’s examples suggest, 
communities persevere not by fighting against the noise, but rather by integrating it and 
thus rendering it no longer noisy. That is why West African communities did not dissolve 
or become somehow less West African with the advent of java prints in the nineteenth 
century, and why Scottish communities did not become less Scottish with the advent of 
bagpipes. 
 The conclusion that I would like to draw from this consideration of the 
communitarian objection is that the choice between the extreme version of the 
communitarian thesis, according to which morality requires a constant struggle against 
the noise, and the extreme version of the Serresian thesis, according to which morality 
requires precisely the renunciation of that struggle, represents a false dichotomy. In the 
increasingly interconnected world, where the vous is becoming more and more separated 
from the où, Serres recognizes the possibility for new kinds of interpersonal and political 
relationships, entered into by subjects who identify themselves not primarily with 
reference to their communities, cultures, ethnic groups, religions, etc., but rather with 
reference to the open dimension of possibility that we all share in common. Over time, as 
Serres puts it, the connective will replace the collective.43 But the word “replace,” I want 
to argue, is certainly too strong. The processes of globalization that give Serres cause for 
optimism really do bring to light a dimension of open possibility that subtends our more 
determinate, particular identities. Nonetheless, it is just as incorrect to say that we are 
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that dimension as it is to say that we are Americans, English speakers, wristwatch 
collectors, etc. Identification with that dimension can never really replace our more 
particular identifications. Serres himself seems to have recognized this point in his earlier 
work. In The Troubadour of Knowledge, Serres provides an especially intuitive 
illustration of the relation between identity and the dimension of open possibility: 
Have you ever tended goal for your team, while an adversary hurries to take a clean, 
close shot? Relaxed, as if free, the body mimes the future participle, fully ready to 
unwind: toward the highest point, at ground level, or halfway up, in both directions, left 
and right; toward the center of the solar plexus, a starry plateau launches its virtual 
branches in all directions at once, like a bouquet of axons.44 
To be a goalkeeper, one must be être-n’importe-où, able virtually to occupy numerous 
different positions at once. Preparing for the impending shot on goal, the goalkeeper 
experiences in an immediate, bodily way the open dimension of possibility. But of course 
the goalkeeper must also actualize that possibility, choosing one of the many possible 
positions and thereby becoming, at least to a certain degree, être-là. In the experience of 
the goalkeeper, then, être-n’importe-où and être-là are inextricable; there is no question 
of choosing one over the other. Likewise, the increased interconnectedness of the 
globalized world brings into relief a kind of pluripotent subjectivity that subtends 
particular, community-based identifications, but that cannot entirely replace them. 
Although we have the potential to adapt to any culture, to speak any language, and to 
appreciate any kind of artistic expression, we must actualize that potential in determinate 
ways, in accordance with the norms of determinate communities. The connective, then, 
does not replace the collective. There is reason to hope, however, that it can render the 
collective less insular, bringing into relief the ways in which particular communities 
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constitute variations on a common human theme, and thus rendering our particular 
identifications less oppositional and violent. 
  The third and final objection that I would like to address concerns the relation 
between particular identifications and identification with the empty, universal I. The stem 
cell, to return to Serres’s analogy, represents the empty universal: it contains potentially 
all the different kinds of cells. Nonetheless, the stem cell is a stem cell precisely in not 
being a skin cell, a blood cell, or any other kind of differentiated cell. Its identity, like the 
identity of anything else, is established by way of exclusion. The stem cell remains one 
kind of cell among others. The same is true for the person who renounces the struggle 
against the noise. If I learn to identify myself with the empty, universal I, maintaining a 
position of openness toward the whole world—with Australian Aborigines and 
Palestinians, Muslims and Hindus, plumbers and hedge fund managers—it nonetheless 
remains the case that I am not myself an Aborigine, a plumber, etc. My being who I am, 
the open, globalized subject participating in the universal we, excludes the possibility of 
my identifying myself with any particular, determinate we. Again, my identity remains 
one among others. 
 The practical consequence of this fact is brought out in an especially perspicuous 
way by Serres himself in his book Detachment, where he retells the famous story of the 
encounter between Diogenes and Alexander the Great. Alexander figures in the story as 
the master of war and by extension of the hedged-in space of social and political life. 
Diogenes, on the other hand, represents the ideal of openness: “he has forsaken exchange, 
damage, gift, selling and buying, value….  He has left comparison, from which comes all 
the evil of the world.”45 In renouncing the attachments that give rise to rivalry and 
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conflict, Diogenes attempts to create the possibility for relations of peace. Paying a visit 
to Diogenes, Alexander asks “what do you want, what do you desire? My glory and my 
power are capable of giving you everything.”46 Uninterested in the kinds of goods that 
Alexander is capable of bestowing, Diogenes requests merely that he step aside and stop 
blocking the sun. This story is typically taken to exemplify Diogenes’ disdain for worldly 
goods and for the oppositional relations to which they give rise. But Serres sees 
something different: in adopting the stance of openness, Diogenes sets himself up in a 
relation of rivalry with Alexander, competing for glory and winning. “I suspect this 
conceited dog to have dragged his barrel there, on the public square, in the fervent 
expectation of being able to provoke the king who would pass by, just as a spider 
stretches its sticky threads to capture flies. Playing the weak to be stronger than power.”47 
Even Diogenes, the self-proclaimed citizen of the world, establishes his particular 
identity through relations of opposition. 
 We should not conclude from this, though, that Serres’s prescriptions for 
mitigating evil are entirely impracticable and therefore futile. What the story of 
Alexander and Diogenes helps to bring out, I think, is that we cannot fail to make noise.  
Serres describes his Gascon dialect as making noise and thus as helping to establish a 
relation of belonging with the others who understand that noise. But even if Serres spoke 
perfectly unaccented French (supposing there were such a thing), his language would still 
be noisy for all those who spoke a particular dialect or who could not speak French at all.  
And if he spoke Esperanto, his language would be noisy for nearly everyone in the world. 
Likewise, the language of globalized, universal humanity, exemplified by the 
cosmopolitan Diogenes, makes noise and thus gives rise to relations of belonging and 
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exclusion. This strongly suggests that we cannot hope to extinguish the passion for 
belonging entirely. Evil, it seems, will always be with us. Nonetheless, the noise that 
Diogenes makes is at least less noisy that that of the nationalist or the racist. If Diogenes 
in fact harmed Alexander in some way by requesting that he step aside, then that harm 
was certainly less severe than the kinds that have resulted from other, more common 
forms of exclusion. And this suggests that although Serres’s prescriptions of openness, 
connection, and tolerance will never result in the eradication of evil, they nonetheless 
constitute an important contribution to its mitigation. 
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